Why is the Cuban Embargo Still in Place?
analysis by Steve Anchell
“The embargo on Cuba is the most comprehensive set of U.S. sanctions on any country, including the other countries designated by the U.S. government to be state sponsors of terrorism.”
In 1959 the Cuban Revolution succeeded in overthrowing the rule of North American gangsters as well as the corrupt and repressive dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista. The U.S. government monitored the revolution with trepidation though many leaders felt that it could be controlled. When Fidel Castro proved to be both uncontrollable and an adherent to Marxist-Leninist ideals, the U.S. turned against him with an unprecedented vengeance.
The first sanctions were imposed in January 1961, the last month of President Eisenhower’s second term in office. They were a partial embargo banning the import of Cuban sugar cane. By the end of 1962 the full economic embargo was in place “with the single exception of licensed sales of food and medicine …” More acts strengthening the embargo followed culminating in the House and Senate passage of H.R. 927, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, in 1996. Known as the Helms-Burton Act it contains the following stated purposes:
(1) To assist the Cuban people in regaining their freedom and prosperity, as well as in joining the community of democratic countries that are flourishing in the Western Hemisphere;
(2) To strengthen international sanctions against the Castro government;
(3) To provide for the continued national security of the United States in the face of continuing threats from the Castro government of terrorism, theft of property from United States nationals by the Castro government, and the political manipulation by the Castro government of the desire of Cubans to escape that results in mass migration to the United States;
(4) To encourage the holding of free and fair democratic elections in Cuba, conducted under the supervision of internationally recognized observers;
(5) To provide a policy framework for United States support to the Cuban people in response to the formation of a transition government or a democratically elected government in Cuba; and
(6) To protect United States nationals against confiscatory takings and the wrongful trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro regime.
Fifty-five years later the embargo has proved to be singularly ineffective, even to the point of strengthening Cuban resolve and bolstering the Castro dictatorship. The New York Times “has long called for an end to America’s embargo, which has strengthened the hand of Mr. Castro, his brother Fidel and other hard-liners who have used it as an excuse for their disastrous misrule in Havana. And it has hurt the Cuban people whom we claim to want to help.”
A succession of U.S. Presidents, beginning with Richard Nixon, have proposed a variety of solutions for ending the embargo and normalizing relations, only to be rebuffed by the Cubans in one form or another. Whether it is through adventurism in Angola or the imprisonment of Alan Gross, when rapprochement seemed likely the Cubans have conveniently found a way to derail the process.
Why is the embargo still in place?
When the U.S. established full diplomatic relations with China in 1979 few if any substantial concessions either to ending civil rights abuses, releasing political prisoners, or moving towards democracy were imposed. In 1989 the Chinese Army fired upon and killed an estimated 300 – 1,000 protestors in Tiananmen Square. Other than the usual and expected diplomatic outrage on behalf of the U.S. government there were no further reprecussions against the Chinese Communist regime. If communist China is on the U.S. most favored nations list, why is the embargo still in place?
There are many who believe that it is the opposition of the anti-Castro Cubans, concentrated in Cuba, that prevents the embargo from being lifted. But anti-Castro Cubans, concentrated in Miami, are only an excuse for maintaining the embargo—not the real impediment. And while Cuban-Americans are a highly organized and vocal minority, they do not represent the majority of U.S. citizens who cannot comprehend the continuing purpose of maintaining the embargo.
Cuban-Americans have long ago ceased having hegemony on this matter. Only the remnants of the older generation, mostly those who fled the embargo and their immediate offspring, are left among the fervent embargo supporters. Polls taken since 2000 have shown an increasing number of Cuban-Americans believe the embargo is a failed policy and should be lifted.
Who benefits by maintaining the embargo?
If we discount first generation Cuban-Americans, who are increasingly marginalized by age and attrition, we are left with three groups that benefit by the embargo. The first is politicians. Senator Marco Rubio initially won his seat through the support of Cuban-American hardliners. And even though his rabid anti-Castro stance is out-of-step with the majority of young Cubans it is one that he personally believes, supports, and will never abandon. The same can be said for Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Congressman Marion Diaz-Balart.
The second group to benefit is U.S. agribusiness and pharmaceuticals. Since the imposition of the full embargo in 1962 there have been a series of amendments that have either allowed or taken away the right of major U.S. agribusiness and pharmaceuticals to sell food and drugs directly to Cuba for humanitarian purposes.
Under the terms of the 2000 “Trade Sanctions Reform And Export Enhancement Act” (TSRA) pharmaceuticals are allowed to sell medicinal drugs to Cuba. For the most part the product they sell are outdated drugs no longer used in the U.S. This is a highly lucrative market for these companies needing to offload overstocked supplies. In the case of agribusiness, as a result of the TSRA “the USA has been the major supplier of food and agricultural products to Cuba.”
“In 2008, Cuba imported more than US$700 million worth of food and agricultural products from the USA.”  In 2009 restrictions were loosened even further. Today, nearly all the food served to tourists, the major source of income for Cuba, comes from the U.S. Food loaded onto ships in Florida arrives three hours later in Havana to be distributed to government owned hotels, restaurants, and privately owned government licensed paladars (home restaurants).
Although the Cubans are capable of producing nearly all the food they require for themselves and tourists, what they lack is the infrastructure to get it to the markets where it is needed. Several years ago the government made a push to try and become food self-sufficient, or at least make a significant reduction in dependency on the U.S. Farms were directed to grow the crops needed to supply the restaurants and hotels in Havana. Unfortunately, due to the lack of investment capital to purchase new trucks and spare parts to keep the old ones running, most of the food rotted at the pick-up locations.
Along with U.S. food and pharmaceutical products, the U.S. sugar cane industry centered in Louisiana and Hawaii, and the sugar beet industry, do not want Cuban sugar back on the open market. Lifting the embargo will more than likely include concessions made to Cuba that will allow them to export an annual sugar quota to the U.S. This would be an expedient means of helping Cuba recover economically and one that many people, including the U.S. sugar industry, expect as a natural consequence of the end of hostilities.
The third group that benefits by the embargo is the Castro dictatorship. Although it has evolved into an oligarchy, the figureheads and center of power are still Fidel and Raul. Oligarchy or dictatorship, nothing serves a ruling government better than an outside enemy. And although Fidel has made periodic overtures to the U.S. to lift the embargo, whenever it appeared rapprochement might be possible, the government, his government, would shoot down a “Brothers to the Rescue” flight, or round-up political dissenters in a show of defiance, or arrest a U.S. agent provocateur, as mentioned previously. While it could be argued that the timing has always been coincidence, the number of coincidences is too great to dismiss them out of hand.
As Fidel Castro’s physical and mental vitality wanes the ruling oligarchy has been attempting to put reforms in place to smooth what they perceive to be the inevitable lifting of the embargo, including privatization of business and property ownership. The hope being that there will be enough freedoms and reforms in place that lifting the embargo will result in a smooth transition to the new paradigm, insuring their continued rule, and averting the possibility of political upheaval that often results from major shifts of this kind. If bloodshed and discontent can be avoided the ruling elite have an excellent chance of retaining their power.
On the U.S. side, the vehemence against lifting the embargo expressed by the current spate of Republican Presidential candidates is out of step with the majority of Americans opinions, and the self-interest of the U.S. It appears to be based either on an anti-Obama stance or a deeply held anti-communist, anti-Castro ideology.
Should a Democrat win the Oval Office lifting the embargo will depend entirely on whether the Democratic Party also wins a majority in Congress. In this scenario the embargo will be lifted before the end of their first term, most likely within their third year.
Should a Republican win the election it will depend on their ideological point of view. If their opposition to lifting the embargo is based on anti-Obama posturing then Congress, regardless of who holds the majority, will vote to lift the embargo within their first year.
This would be an obvious political expediency. The Republican President would be hailed for his international diplomacy and as a peacemaker. At least within the U.S. this would give the newly elected President credibility in future international dealings, beginning with Iran, Afghanistan, and North Korea. Any acknowledgement of President Obama’s efforts would be characterized as a “failed” attempt to end the embargo.
 United States Government Accountability Office, Economic Sanctions, Agencies Face Competing Priorities in Enforcing the U.S. Embargo on Cuba, November 2007.
 English, T.J. Havana Nocturne: How the Mob Owned Cuba and Then Lost It to the Revolution.
 Sweig, Julia A. Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know, 2nd ed. p. 88.
 Sweig. p. 88.
 Thomas: H.R. 927 Section 3, Purposes. Ibid.
 The New York Times, “Lift the Cuban Embargo” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/13/opinion/lift-the-cuban-embargo.html?_r=0.
 Sweig. p. 89 – 93.
 Sweig. pp. 271 – 275.
 Encyclopædia Britannica, “Tiananmen Square incident,” http://www.britannica.com/event/Tiananmen-Square-incident
 Portes, Alejandro and Rubén G. Rumbaut. Immigrant America: A Portrait, 3rd ed.
 Sweig, p. 237
 Amnesty International. “The U.S. Embargo Against Cuba: Its Impact on Economic and Social Rights” http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/cuba-the-us-embargo-against-cuba-its-impact-on-economic-and-social-rights?page=show.
 Amnesty International. Ibid.
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